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Abstract—ZigBee has been recently drawing a lot of attention as a promising solution for ubiquitous computing. The ZigBee devices
are normally resource-limited, making the network susceptible to a variety of security threats. This paper presents a severe attack
on ZigBee networks termed as ghost, which leverages the underlying vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.15.4 security suites to deplete
the energy of the devices. We manifest that the impact of ghost is severe as it can reduce the lifetime of devices from years to days
and facilitate a variety of threats including denial of service and replay attacks. We highlight that merely deploying a standard suite
of advanced security techniques does not necessarily guarantee improved security, but instead might be leveraged by adversaries to
cause severe disruption in the network. We propose several recommendations on how to localize and withstand the ghost and other
related attacks in ZigBee networks. Extensive simulations are provided to show the impact of the ghost and the performance of the
proposed recommendations. Moreover, physical experiments also have been conducted and the observations confirm the severity of
the impact by the ghost attack. We believe that the presented work will aid the researchers to improve the security of ZigBee further.
Index Terms—ZigBee; security; energy depletion attack; countermeasures; experiments
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
DUE to its expandability, low cost, ease-of-use, andminimal maintenance, IEEE 802.15.4 based ZigBee,
has been recently drawing a lot of attention to become
the most prevalent solution for ubiquitous computing in
everyday life. Since the origin of ZigBee, ZigBee alliance
has essentially targeted their efforts on building a global
wireless language for myriad of everyday devices such
as light switches, thermostats, smart devices, remote
controls as well as more complex sensor devices found
abundantly in the health care, commercial building and
industrial automation sectors [1]–[5].
Most of the applications over ZigBee are, however,
security sensitive. For instance, it is envisioned that
in a smart grid network, automated smart meters will
exchange information about the energy consumption of
homes to utility companies in a timely fashion. If such
information is delivered in a plain-text manner, others
could retrieve sensitive private information about the
home residents such as their living habits and the time
they are not at home. Malicious ones can also inject false
energy use information to interrupt the billing system
[6]. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard addresses the security
requirements through a medium access control (MAC)
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layer package, providing fundamental security services
ranging from data confidentiality, data integrity to replay
protection [7]. Despite that the standard provides these
basic services, Sastry et al. outlined a number of security
problems and pitfalls when using the IEEE 802.15.4 spec-
ification, especially pertaining to the initialization vector
management, key management and integrity protection
[8], and they also suggested several recommendations
to improve the security posture of the specification.
Zheng et al. presented more attacks on the physical and
MAC sub-layers, including jamming, capture and tam-
pering, exhaustion, collision and unfairness [9]. Besides
research efforts, nowadays, off-the-shelf attack toolkits
like KillerBee [10] are available that can be leveraged
even by a novice adversary to explore and exploit the
security of ZigBee networks. Using KillerBee and an
IEEE 802.15.4 compatible radio interface, an adversary
can carry out several attacks ranging from surreptitious
eavesdropping to traffic injection with a little or no effort.
Markedly, people need to have a solid understanding
of the security performance of ZigBee before positioning
it as a major player in the market of ubiquitous comput-
ing. In this paper, our in-depth analysis of the ZigBee
standard identified a potential flaw related to sending
security headers in clear text. These security headers
are treated as critical parameters in the specification to
provide semantic security and replay protection. A key
question is: what might be the consequences if a malicious
one masquerades as a trusted device by crafting the security
headers? IEEE 802.15.4 provides protection to integrity
related attacks by including a cryptographically secure
checksum (aka message integrity code (MIC)) with each
message sent to a recipient. When an adversary crafts
an invalid security header without knowing the key
2generating the MIC, although the integrity attack fails,
the recipient device in fact expends certain amount of energy
receiving and processing those bogus messages. In particular,
it is shown that the security computing energy can be far
from ignorable [11], [12]. If an intelligent adversary sends
a number of such crafted messages to the victim device,
a significant amount of energy will be used leading to
battery depletion of the device.
There are studies on jamming attacks, MAC misbe-
havior, sleep deprivation via power attacks, and link
layer exhaustion attacks in wireless networks [9], [13],
[14]. Smart adversaries may attack the protocols in a
deeper level, for instance Temporal Key Integrity Proto-
col (TKIP) MIC attack in IEEE 802.11 networks in which
an attacker decodes the payload one byte at a time
by using multiple replays and observing the response
over the air on MIC failures [15], TCP SYN attack in
which an attacker sends a chain of SYN requests to a
victim system in an attempt to consume enough server
resources and launch denial of service (DoS) attack [16]
against public key cryptographic operations in sensor
networks [17]. These attacks thwart the legitimate de-
vices from using the medium and thereby are able to
consume large amounts of victim devices’ energy, refer-
ring to [18], [19] and the references therein. As opposed
to these efforts, this paper demonstrates a novel and
severe attack termed as ghost-in-the-wireless (aka ghost)
on commercial ZigBee networks (with symmetric keys),
in which a malicious one constructs bogus messages to
lure the receiver to do superfluous security-related com-
putations to intentionally deplete the energy of devices.
The aftermath of the ghost attack is perilous as it will
cut back the lifetime of devices from years to days (to
be demonstrated by our simulation and experimental
results) and further facilitate an adversary to execute a
variety of after-depletion threats like denial of service,
replay attack and loss of confidentiality.
In the literature, there also resource depletion attacks
in many wireless networks. For example, adversaries
can repeatedly send connection requests to exhaust the
energy of implantable medical devices [20]. In ad hoc
sensors networks, an adversary can drain the energy
of sensors by purposely sending messages to construct
artificial routing paths or introduce loops to the routing
process of legitimate sensors [21]. However, how to exe-
cute such attacks on ZigBee is unknown yet. Moreover,
the seriousness of ghost attack on commercial ZigBee
networks, where devices that run on batteries have
stringent power constraints, has not been explored.
In this paper, we exploit the ZigBee security headers
to launch the ghost attack. We highlight the fact that
merely deploying standard advanced security protocols
does not necessarily ensure improved security, but in-
stead might be leveraged by attackers to cause severe
disruption in the network. Moreover, we provide quali-
tative analysis and quantitative simulations as well as
experiments to demonstrate the severity of the ghost
attack. We believe that our work in this paper will aid
researchers to further improve the security posture of
energy-constrained wireless networks.
In summary, this paper has five-fold contributions:
• We propose a novel and severe attack on ZigBee
networks, termed as ghost, which exploits the un-
derlying vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.15.4 secu-
rity suites to cause an intentional energy failure of
devices.
• We theoretically analyze the impact of the ghost
attack on the victim node’s lifetime, and develop
an analytical model to quantify the impact of DoS
attack (induced from ghost) on the throughput of a
multi-hop chain network.
• We propose a three-phase algorithm to detect and
localize the attacker based on network flow varia-
tions. We also propose several recommendations on
how to withstand the ghost and its related attacks in
ZigBee networks.
• Extensive computer simulation results are presented
to demonstrate the impact of the ghost attack and
the efficiency of the proposed solutions. Particularly,
we show that the ghost attack can not only reduce
the device lifetime from years to days by depleting
energy, but also lead to the violation of the three
basic principles of security, confidentiality, integrity
and availability.
• We validate the effectiveness of ghost attack by con-
ducting physical experiments on both a single-hop
and a multi-hop ZigBee networks, where each node
is equipped with CC2420 RF Transceiver that is
compliant with the 2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 reviews the IEEE 802.15.4 security architecture. Section
3 presents the ghost attack and some analysis. Section 4
discusses some other severe attacks stemming from the
ghost attack while Section 5 proposes the corresponding
countermeasures. Section 6 presents the simulation re-
sults to demonstrate the impact of ghost and ghost-related
attacks and the proposed solutions. Section 7 presents
the physical experiment results. Finally, Section 8 gives
the conclusion remarks.
2 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we mainly pay our attention to the
security services provided by the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
layer [7]. The standard particularly provides four basic
security services for use by the higher layer applications:
access control, data integrity, data confidentiality, and
sequential freshness for replay protection, each of which
is described briefly in the sequel. The MAC layer is
responsible for providing security services on specified
incoming and outgoing frames when requested to do so
by the higher layers. The higher layer (i.e., the applica-
tion layer) indicates its choice of the security suite by
setting the security control field in the auxiliary security
header of the message, which identifies 8 candidate secu-
rity levels ranging from 000 to 111, as shown in Table 1.
3The security level configuration can be adjusted message
by message. The absence of security parameters indicates
“no security by default”. We urge the interested readers
to refer the excellent write up in [8] for details about the
security architecture of the standard.
TABLE 1: Security suites in IEEE 802.15.4.
Security Level/Id Security Suite Confidentiality Integrity
000 None % %
001 AES-CBC-MAC-32 % !
010 AES-CBC-MAC-64 % !
011 AES-CBC-MAC-128 % !
100 AES-CTR ! %
101 AES-CCM-32 ! !
110 AES-CCM-64 ! !
111 AES-CCM-128 ! !
Access Control: The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer protocol
prevents unauthorized devices from participating in the
network by maintaining a list of valid devices, com-
monly known as access control list (ACL). For each in-
coming message, the receiving device checks the source
address against the list of valid addresses in the table.
If there is a match, the message is either accepted or
forwarded to the next hop, otherwise it is dropped.
Although such an access control mechanism can keep
out the unauthorized parties from participating in the
network, a number of issues emerge such as the spoofing
attacks (data integrity issue) where an adversary mas-
querade as a valid user through crafting messages (e.g.,
source address) to bypass the ACL checks.
Data Integrity: The standard resolves data integrity
issue by including a message integrity code, which is
computed by applying a hash function over the message
and pre-shared secret key (aka the symmetric key) [22].
The MIC tag along with the message is then sent to the
receiver. Upon reception, the receiver can validate the
integrity by checking whether the received MIC tag can
be regenerated using the same hash function, the shared
symmetric key, and the received message. If positive,
the integrity is considered as maintained, i.e., both the
message and the MIC tag were not modified; otherwise,
the received message will be discarded. The standard
provides data integrity services through AES-CBC-MAC
and AES-CCM with three possible lengths of the MIC
tag, i.e., 32 bits, 64 bits, or 128 bits.
Data Confidentiality: Underpinning the goal of con-
fidentiality are the encryption schemes. Besides data
encryption, the semantic security is needed to ensure
that the attacker cannot learn even the partial informa-
tion about the messages that have been encrypted. A
common approach to realizing semantic security is to
leverage a unique nonce, typically a counter or random
value, for each invocation of the encryption algorithm.
The main purpose of a nonce is to add discrepancy
to the encryption process when there is little or no
discrepancy in the set of messages. Since the receiver
should rely on the same nonce to decrypt the messages,
nonces are typically sent in the same message with the
encrypted data in plain text, without keeping it secret.
This work is concerned with the malicious ones manipulating
those nonces sent in plain text. In the sequel, we will show
that how an adversary can leverage the plain-text nonce
to launch the ghost attack. To provide semantic security,
both algorithms of AES-CTR and AES-CCM use a 13-
bytes nonce, which consists of an 8-bytes source address
and a 5-bytes counter (that comprises the frame counter
(4 bytes) and the security control field (1 byte) defined
in the auxiliary security header).
Sequential Freshness for Replay Protection: Al-
though data confidentiality and data integrity can pre-
vent the network from a variety of known threats such
as eavesdropping and spoofing, these schemes cannot
protect the network from replay attacks. With the IEEE
802.15.4 specification, the sender usually assigns a mono-
tonically increasing frame counter to each message and
the receiver rejects those messages with smaller sequence
numbers than it has already seen. The efficiency of this
scheme clearly depends on the amount of time it will
take the frame counters to roll over. To avoid roll over
issues, a 32-bits counter is used in the IEEE 802.15.4.
In addition to replay protection, the frame counters are
considered as an important input to the construction of
nonces for providing semantic security.
3 GHOST-IN-THE-WIRELESS
In this work, we consider a ZigBee network in which
devices are statically deployed and communicate with
one another to form a multi-hop wireless backbone. One
or more devices serve as the coordinator (or gateways)
and provide services for the entire ZigBee network.
This work assumes that all the devices are collaborative,
behave normally, and follow the algorithms correctly by
sending the messages periodically to the coordinator.
Notice that there are already works that talk about
detecting the nodes that does not obey algorithms [23].
Similar to the standard, the cryptographic mechanism
presented in this work is based on the symmetric-key
cryptography and uses keys that are provided by higher
layer processes. The establishment and maintenance of
the keys are outside the scope of this work. As stated
in the standard, we assume a secure implementation of
the cryptographic operations, and secure and authentic
storage of the keying material.
In such an environment, we assume the presence of
single or multiple ghost attackers, equipped with com-
patible IEEE 802.15.4 radios. As opposed to legitimate
devices, the attacker devices have no power or memory
constraints and are assumed to span the attacking range
over a large number of devices. We assume a three-
phase attack model: (a) pre-attack phase — in this phase,
the attacker learns about the network by surreptitiously
eavesdropping, capturing and reverse engineering the
messages; (b) Attack phase — the attacker leverages the
4learned information to execute the ghost attack; and (c)
post-attack/depletion phase — once the energy of devices
are depleted, attacker in this phase executes several other
attacks such as replay attack or confidentiality attack, to
be discussed in Section 4.
3.1 AES Suites
ZigBee uses AES [24] based security suites to provide
fundamental security services like confidentiality, in-
tegrity and replay protection. In this section, we will
initially shed light on the working of each of these
algorithms and then present the proposed ghost attack.
AES-CTR for Encryption. Messages in this mode are
encrypted and decrypted by XORing with the key stream
produced by the AES encrypting sequential counter
block values. Let O = O1, O2, · · · , On denote the output
keystream block. To encrypt a payload with AES-CTR,
the encrypter partitions the plaintext, P , into n 128-bit
blocks P1, P2 · · · , Pn; notice that if the last block is not a
multiple of 128 bits, zeros are padded to it. Each P block
is then XORed with a block of the key stream O to gen-
erate the corresponding ciphertext, C = C1, C2, · · · , Cn.
To avoid reuse of the same output stream O, AES-CTR
requires the sender (encrypter) to generate a unique key
stream per-block per message. The decryption process is
similar to encryption process.
AES-CBC-MAC for Authentication. A message is
authenticated by splitting the input I into n 128 bit
blocks, with necessary padding. Let I = I1, · · · , In and
O = O1, · · · , On denote the input and its corresponding
output block, where O = CIPH(k)[I] and CIPH(k)[I] is
the invocation of AES algorithm on the input block using
the secret key k. The CBC-MAC mode is then defined
as: O1 = CIPH(k)[I1], O2 = CIPH(k)[I2 ⊕ O1], · · · ,
On = CIPH(k)[In ⊕ On−1] and the final block is the
MIC.
AES-CCM for Encryption and Authentication. This
mode consists of two steps: computing the MIC tag
using CBC-MAC and encrypting the message concate-
nated with the MIC tag using CTR mode. Let P =
P1, P2, · · · , Pn and O = O0, O1, O2, · · · , On denote the
plaintext and the output keystream blocks. Then the
CCMmode is defined as follows: P1⊕O1, P2⊕O2, · · ·Pn⊕
On||MIC ⊕O0.
3.2 Attack Phase
AES-CTR, AES-CBC-MAC and AES-CCM depend on the
encryptor to generate a unique keystream per message
(O) to provide semantic security. This task is accom-
plished by leveraging a 16-bytes unique counter con-
structed from the fields in the message intended for
the destination. The 16-bytes counter consists of a 2-
bytes static flags field, a 13-bytes nonce field (comprising
the sender address, the frame counter and the security
level field), and a 1-byte block counter that numbers
the 16-bytes blocks within the message. In addition to
semantic security, the frame counters are used by the
security suite to enable replay protection as well. When
receiving a message, the recipient compares the frame
counter seen in the incoming packet to the highest value
stored in the ACL table. If the incoming packet has a
larger counter value than the stored one, the message
is accepted and the new counter is used to update the
ACL table; otherwise, the message is rejected. With a
4-bytes frame counter, an adversary can carry out a
replay attack only after 232 frames, which is considered
cryptographically secure in practice.
In the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, those message fields
used to construct the 16-bytes counter need to be com-
municated in plain text by the sender. Suppose that a
malicious one injected messages into the network with
increasing frame counters. According to the standard,
the receiving device will accept it as the incoming mes-
sage has a larger counter value than the last observed
one. However, on decrypting the message, receiver will
understand that the message is corrupted by computing
the checksum or the MIC and finally, will drop it.
Although the integrity attack fails, the recipient device
in fact expends a valuable amount of energy accepting
and processing those bogus messages. If an intelligent
attacker sends a number of such crafted bogus messages
to the victim device to lure the receiver to do the
superfluous security-related computations, a significant
amount of energy will be spent leading to battery deple-
tion. We therefore term this attack as ghost-in-the-wireless.
Although there are resource depletion attacks, we show
by ghost how such an attack can be executed in ZigBee.
Our simulation results show that through ghost attack,
one can cut back the lifetime of devices from years to
days.
3.3 Analysis
We present an analytical model to quantify the effect
of a ghost attacker on a victim device (denoted as Di).
Consider that Di works in a duty-cycling mode, which
is a common working mode for low-cost networks such
as wireless sensor networks, with duty-cycle equal to
λ = τ
T
where τ is the duration of an active period and
T is the length of a cycle. Once entering an inactive
period (aka sleep period), the device turns off its radio
and changes CPU state (i.e., forces CPU into some low-
power mode) if no incoming message is being received
or decrypted; otherwise, it turns off its radio once the
incoming message is finished receiving, and changes
CPU state once the message is finished processing. The
attacker sends bogus messages with crafted security
headers to Di at a high frequency (say ρ packets per unit
time), while only those transmitted during Di’s active
period will be effective in depleting its energy. Assume
that the attacker messages are of the same size.
For the victim device, denote Trx as the time spent
by its radio to receive a bogus message, which depends
on message length and data rate. Denote Prx, P
a
cpu, P
i
cpu
and P ocpu as the power required by its radio when in
5receiving mode and by its CPU when in active, idle, and
low-power modes, respectively. The energy consump-
tion of a wireless device depends on the amount of
energy expended on the following states: transmitting,
receiving, computing, idle and sleeping states. Based on
these states, the energy consumption of Di is divided
into three costs: communication cost (i.e., when it is re-
ceiving) Ecomm, computation cost (i.e., when processing
the data) Ecomp, and passive cost (i.e., when it is not
involved in communication, say, sleeping) Epassive.
The computation cost of the device depends on the
amount of energy expended for cryptographic opera-
tions (including decryption and MIC verification). To
compute it, initially, the cost of performing a decryp-
tion/verification in unit of ampere-cycle is computed by
taking the product of the total number of clock cycles
taken by the AES algorithm and the average current
drawn by each CPU cycle. The total energy cost is then
computed by dividing the ampere-cycles by the clock
frequency in cycles/second of a processor and further
multiplying the result with the processor’s operating
voltage. Thus the computation cost for the decryption
and verification of one message is TdecP
a
cpu, where Tdec
denotes the time required for decryption and verification
of a bogus message, which depends on the specific
security suite used. Taking the CPU cost during the
packet receiving period into account, we have
Ecomp =np
(
TdecP
a
cpu + TrxP
i
cpu
)
(1)
where np is the number of messages that will be pro-
cessed during an active period. np ≈
⌈
τ
max{Ta,
1
ρ
}
⌉
, where
Ta , Tdec + Trx is the total time to receive and process
one bogus message.
As we are concerned about the amount of energy spent
by the victim device Di in receiving the bogus packets
from the ghost attacker, the communication cost will be
mainly determined by the receiving cost and is
Ecomm ≈


npTaPrx, if npTa ≥ τ
τPrx, otherwise
=max{npTa, τ}Prx (2)
The passive cost includes sleep cost and idle cost
between the completion time for processing a current
message and the arriving time of the next message.
Hence,
Epassive =


(τ − npTa)P icpu + (T − τ)P
o
cpu,
if npTa < τ
(T − npTa)P ocpu, otherwise.
(3)
Then, the energy consumption of the victim device re-
ceiving and processing a message from the ghost attacker
is computed as Ep = Ecomm + Ecomp + Epassive .
3.3.1 Number of Messages Leading to Depletion
Let Eresidual be the amount of energy available to the
device and Ethreshold be the threshold level below which
the device fails to participate in the network, then we
have the following condition to be true for the ghost
attack to be successful:
Eresidual −mEp ≤ Ethreshold (4)
where m is the number of bogus messages for victim
device. From eqn.(4), it follows that the ghost attacker
should send at least m ≥ Eresidue−Ethreshold
Ep
packets to
successfully deplete the energy.
3.3.2 Lifetime Reduction
Let E0 be the initial energy of the victim device. If no
attacker presents, its lifetime is L0 =
E0
Ep,0
where
Ep,0 = τ(Prx + P
i
cpu), (5)
if we neglect the sleep cost. If npTa ≥ τ , based on the
above analysis, we have Ep = np(TdecP
a
cpu + TrxP
i
cpu) +
npTaPrx. Thus, the ratio of L0 over the victim device’s
lifetime under ghost attack becomes
L0
L
=npTa
Tdec
Ta
P acpu +
Trx
Ta
P icpu + Prx
τ(Prx + P icpu)
=
npTa
τ
(
1 +
Tdec
Ta
P acpu − P
i
cpu
Prx + P icpu
)
>
npTa
τ
(6)
That is L
L0
< τ
npTa
. Similarly, if npTa < τ ,
L0
L
=1 +
npTdec
τ
P acpu − P
i
cpu
Prx + P icpu
(7)
Above two equations clearly show that the lifetime of
the victim device is reduced to some extend, and the
amount of reduction can be significantly large if npTa is
much larger than τ .
4 OTHER ATTACKS DUE TO GHOST
In this section, we will demonstrate a number of severe
attacks stemming from ghost attack and propose coun-
termeasures to mitigate their impact.
4.1 Denial of Service (DoS)
DoS can be easily executed by a ghost attacker in three
ways. (1) DoS due to high computational load on the device.
In a ghost attack, the adversary sends a number of
bogus messages to quickly deplete the energy of the
victim device and thereby, suspend the availability of
the services. It turns out that if the network has some
traffic abnormality detection schemes in place, sending
such numerous messages in short period of time can be
easily caught. To escape from the detection, for instance,
ghost attacker(s) can send messages either at different
times or at different addresses to a subset of victim
devices in its range. (2) DoS due to MAC misbehavior: The
6IEEE 802.15.4 utilizes distributed contention resolution
mechanisms such as CSMA/CA for sharing the wireless
channel. Under CSMA/CA protocol, only one transmis-
sion can happen at any given point in time in a given
area and therefore, to achieve this CSMA/CA requires
devices to sense the channel for idleness before it can
transmit. In such an environment, if a ghost attacker
continuously sends the traffic to the victim host, all
devices within the interference region will be deprived
of channel access and services. Moreover, each device
has to spend a significant amount of time sensing and
waiting to get access to channel, which again will lead
to energy depletion. (3) DoS with a post-depletion replay
attack: Such an attack is to be discussed in Section 4.2.1.
4.1.1 Analysis
To illustrate the effect of DoS attack on the net-
work throughput performance, we conduct mathemat-
ical analysis based on a simple multi-hop network as
shown in Fig. 1. All the nodes apply the CSMA/CA
protocol for channel access. Assume each node randomly
generates packets (of the same length L) at the same
rate λ packets/slot, where a slot is the backoff slot in
IEEE 802.15.4 standard. For ease of analysis, we use
the following CSMA/CA parameters: the minimum and
maximum backoff exponents are the same as macBE,
CW=1, i.e., a node will start to transmit packet if it
finds the channel is idle in previous slot. The nodes send
packets to the gateway through the paths shown in this
figure. A node will switch to receiving mode only when
its MAC buffer is empty. The gateway node keeps in
receiving mode and listening packets from others. The
ghost attacker sends bogus packets at a constant rate patt
independent of the channel state.
gateway n5 n4 n3 n2 n1 
attacker 
Fig. 1: A multi-hop network formed by 5 ZigBee nodes
and a gateway, where node 2 and 3 are in the interference
range of a ghost attacker.
For each node, define τi, αi and ρi as the probabili-
ties that this node conducts a clear channel assessment
(CCA), the channel is idle when it conducts a CCA,
and that there is at least one packet in its MAC buffer,
respectively in a slot. Conditioned on that its buffer is
nonempty, a node will transmit a packet with probability
pi and the packet will be successfully received (without
collision) by its next-hop node with probability psi . We
extend the model in [25] for single-hop networks to the
multi-hop network shown in Fig. 1. Since the modeling
approach is the same for each node, below we shall
focus on node 2. Since the backoff exponent is constant,
according to [25],
τ2 =
1
b¯+ 1 + Lα2
, (8)
where b¯ , 1
2
(2macBE − 1) is the average backoff length.
When this node conducts a CCA, the channel is idle
only when none of its neighbors (including the attacker)
is transmitting (i.e., none of them starts transmitting in
either of the previous L slots). Therefore,
α2 = 1− L [1− (1− patt)(1 − ρ1p1)(1 − ρ3p3)] . (9)
By definition,
p2 = τ2α2, ρ2 = min
{
λ+ ρ1p1p
s
1
p2
, 1
}
. (10)
where ρ1p1p
s
1 is the rate of packets being received from
node 1. When node 2 transmits a packet, the packet will
be successfully received by node 3 only if: 1) neither
node 1 nor the attacker starts to transmit packet simul-
taneously as node 2, 2) node 4 does not transmit packet
in any slot during the transmission by node 2, and 3)
node 3 is in receiving mode. Therefore,
ps2 = (1 − ρ1p1)(1− patt)(1 − Lρ4p4)(1− ρ3). (11)
Based on the same approach, the performance of the
other nodes can be modeled. Then, the throughput of
each node can be calculated.

S1 = ρ1p1p
s
1p
s
2p
s
3p
s
4,
S2 =
λ
λ+ρ1p1p
s
1
ρ2p2p
s
2p
s
3p
s
4,
S3 =
λ
λ+ρ2p2p
s
2
ρ3p3p
s
3p
s
4,
S4 =
λ
λ+ρ3p3p
s
3
ρ4p4p
s
4,
S5 = ρ5p5p
s
5
(12)
We name the scenario shown in Fig. 1 as case 1.
For comparison, another case (case 2) is also considered
in which the attacker’s interference range only covers
node 3. Numerical results are shown in Fig. 1, where
L = 3,macBE = 3, λ = 0.02. In both cases, due to
increase of attack intensity, nodes that are within the
interference range of the ghost have fewer opportunities
to send out packets, and their throughput drops quickly.
Since packets from node 1 transverse the interfered
area, its throughput drops even quicker than that of the
nodes within the area. On the other hand, due to less
interference from node 3, the throughput of node 4 and
5 whose packet routes do not cross the interfered area
may gain some improvement. From Fig. 2(d), we observe
that, even node 2 is a relay of node 1, they experience
similar throughput variation when node 4, a common
relay of them, is under attack. We take advantage of such
observation to develop an attacker localization method
in Section 5.1.
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Fig. 2: Network performance under various attack rate.
patt = 0 means the scenario without ghost.
4.2 Post-Depletion Attacks
What happens when the device encounters an energy
depletion? If no specific controls are taken, the device
will emerge with a cleared ACL table on reboot and
consequently, all the nonces or the frame counters will
be reset to the initial value 0. Upon such resetting, we
see the plausibility of two attacks:
4.2.1 Replay Attack due to Frame Counter Reuse
Replay attack can cause severe problems. For example,
medical devices such as fitbits, pacemakers and insulin
pumps which replay old messages can lead to erroneous
outputs and dangerous events. Below we show that a
ghost can launch replay attack. Consider a ghost attacker
who captures a certain number of legitimate packets in
the beginning (pre-attack phase) and starts depleting the
energy of the devices through bogus messages. When
the counters are reset to 0 upon restart, the attacker can
start replaying those messages. The replay attack can
lead to serious results in two aspects. (1) The attack can
have the receiver consume obsolete messages, leading to
unexpected operations. (2) The replay attack can result in
the denial of service. Specifically, if the attacker replays
messages with frame counters larger than the current
legitimate value maintained in the ACL table, the ACL
table will then be updated by such replayed messages.
Consequently, in future, when legitimate devices send
messages with the actual frame counter, the message will
be rejected as it carries a counter value less than what is
currently stored in the ACL of the victim device (which
was updated by the replayed messages).
We would like to emphasize that the ghost attack
significantly facilitates the chance of launching a replay
attack. From the IEEE 802.15.4 specification, it follows
that by leveraging a 4-bytes counter, one can execute a
replay attack only after 232 frames; nonetheless, in this
work, we manifest that by executing the ghost attack, an
adversary can use a number of messages which is far
less than 232 to deplete the energy of a victim device.
Upon the restart of this victim device, the attacker can
launch the relay attack.
4.2.2 Loss of Confidentiality due to Nonce Reuse
According to the standard, messages destined for the
next hop devices are encrypted by XORing the plaintext
message P with the unique keystream O constructed
from the unique nonces, static flags and the pre-shared
key. Take the AES-CTR scheme for instance. To encrypt
a payload, the encrypter partitions the plaintext, P ,
into n 128-bit blocks P1, P2 · · · , Pn; if the last block
is not a multiple of 128 bits, zeros are padded to it.
Each P block is then XORed with a block of the key
stream O to generate the corresponding ciphertext, C =
C1, C2, · · · , Cn = P ⊕ O. If the nonces are reused, then
the keystream will repeat for the subsequent messages.
Thus, for a different plain text P ′, the output of the
encryptor will be C′ = P ′⊕O. Assume that the attacker
has captured the ciphertexts C and C′, then a simple
XORing of the two ciphertexts will lead to C′ ⊕ C =
(P ′⊕O)+(P ⊕O) = P ′⊕P ; such a simple XOR of plain
texts can trivially be broken using statistical analysis and
the subsequent plaintext messages can be deciphered
without the knowledge of pre-shared key, if the content
of any one message can be guessed.
5 COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we first consider the problem of ghost
attacker localization. Next, we propose add-on mech-
anisms to current IEEE 802.15.4 standard to enhance
network security against ghost.
5.1 Attacker Localization
Although the specific victim node is able to know the
existence of a ghost attacker by checking whether the
number of received bogus messages exceeds a tolerable
level, it, under intense attack, may not be able to timely
inform others since the channel could be unavailable
(occupied by the ghost) and its CPU may be also busy
in processing the bogus messages. Whereas, owing to
the induced DoS impact on the network throughput
(as demonstrated in Fig. 7 in our simulations), other
nodes can still be able to detect and localize the attacker
by analyzing the network flow changes. Consider the
typical cluster based topologies in ZigBee networks. In
a cluster, we let the cluster head (CH), the confluence of
the flows from the other nodes, to carry out the analysis.
As a first attempt to localize ghost attacker in such a
ZigBee network, a three-phase method is proposed as
follows. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the CH to
determine the number of ghosts if they collocate or are
very close by analyzing their DoS impact. However,
8knowing the existence of at least one ghost at a location
already satisfies our purpose.
Phase 1: Identify suspected victim nodes. The CH ap-
plies a moving analysis window to record the through-
put of each node1 in the corresponding cluster, and cal-
culates the percentage of throughput variation (denoted
as ∆Si for node i) in real time. Suspected nodes are
identified by checking the variation along each path.
The observation mentioned in Section 3.3 is utilized to
exclude those nodes outside of the attacker’s interference
area but their packet routes traverse that area. This exclu-
sion operation is controlled by a threshold δ′ as shown in
Algorithm 1. We denote each path as Pl = (l1, l2, . . . , lm)
with l1 as the source node and lm (i.e., the head) as
the destination node. δ is used to eliminate throughput
variance in normal condition.
Algorithm 1: Identify suspected victim nodes.
A ← ∅: set of suspected victim nodes;
for all paths P do
if ∆Sl1 > −δ then
continue;
end
for i← 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
if ∆Sli < −δ then
if i+ 1 = m or |∆Sli −∆Sli+1 | > δ
′ then
add li into A;
if |∆Sli −∆Sli−1 | < δ
′ then
add li−1 into A;
end
end
end
end
end
Phase 2: Group suspected victim nodes. We consider
a general case that neither the number nor interference
ranges of the ghosts is known to the CH. Two suspected
nodes can be considered under the interference of the
same attacker and included in the same group if there is
a circle that covers both of them but does not cover any
other non-suspected nodes. Otherwise, they are consid-
ered to be attacked by different attackers and included
in different groups. Since an attacker may want to span
its attacking range over a large number of nodes, small
clusters will not be considered for attacker localization.
Phase 3: Calculate the Ghost location. For each group,
suppose there are s suspected nodes and the throughput
of each node decreases by ∆Si percent. Then, the at-
tacker’s location is estimated by the following weighted
sum method.
Lghost =
s∑
i=1
∆Si∑s
k=1 ∆Sk
Li, (13)
1. For dense deployment, to save computation cost in analysis, the
CH can select a few paths with the nodes scattering over the area as
uniform as possible for analysis.
where Li is the location of each suspected victim node.
5.2 Add-on Mechanisms
We propose to add techniques such as blacklisting to
current security services provided by standard, in which
each device will maintain a list of devices that are
misbehaving. In the case of ghost attack, if the victim
device observes a certain number of messages with
bogus security headers, it will add the device to the
blacklist and inform the network or the operator about
the attack. One plausible issue with this approach is the
badmouthing attack [23] in which an attacker sends bogus
messages from different addresses and causes the victim
device to blacklist all its surrounding devices, leading to
a temporary disruption or denial of service.
Another approach is to add a second layer of challenge-
response scheme in which the device, after observing
a certain number of bogus messages from a specific
address or when the energy is restored and the commu-
nications are re-initiated, will challenge the attacker with
a random number. The solution requires the attacker
to include the response to the challenge in the next
message for the device. If the attacker is able to respond
to it correctly, it will continue its operation, otherwise,
it will inform the network or the operator about the
attack. Notice that to include correct response in the
message, the attacker needs to know the secret key which
is available only to the legitimate parties and is securely
stored in the device. On restoration of energy, we also
require, as part of the challenge-response scheme, to
establish new keys so that they don’t reuse the same
nonce twice with the same key. Another solution is to
add a timestamp to the protocol and after a reboot,
each device is required to update its timestamp by
communicating with the controller. There are also works
that suggest storing the counter values in non-volatile or
flash memory so that even if the energy is lost, the state
of the device can be restored. Nevertheless, storing and
retrieving values from flash memory is slow and energy
inefficient, specifically for energy constrained devices [8].
6 SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present extensive simulation results
to demonstrate the impact of the proposed ghost attack.
We develop our simulation codes within the NS-3 en-
vironment [26]. We consider a ZigBee network with a
single coordinator serving as the gateway, n legitimate
nodes and a ghost attacker which injects messages with
bogus security headers to drain victim nodes’ energy.
Each ZigBee node is equipped with an 8 MHz proces-
sor. All the nodes apply the non-beacon mode of the
IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA protocol for channel access. We
adopt the energy consumption model presented in [27].
Specifically, the current drain by each node for its CPU
being in active, idle and power-save states are 8.0 mA,
3.2 mA and 110 µA, respectively; the current drain by
each node’s transceiver for receiving and transmitting
9are 7.0 mA and 8.5 mA, respectively; and the transmis-
sion power of each node is 0 dB. We also adopt an
accurate Li-Ion battery model (which is provided in NS-3
based on the models proposed in [28], [29]) for each node
with the initial capacity set as 2.45 Ah to simulate the
energy drain activities. We run the simulation program
on a 1.85 GHz PC. Based on the number of instructions,
the CPU computation time of the PC is mapped to that of
the 8 MHz processors to approximate the computational
energy consumption involved in the ZigBee security
protocol.
6.1 Energy Expenditure for Security
We first compare the energy expenditures in encryption
and decryption for the security suites listed in Table 1. To
avoid the impact from other factors such as interference
and routing, we simulate a two-node scenario in this
experiment, i.e., a ghost attacker sends packets to a
victim node. The victim node runs in a duty-cycling
mode with fixed duty cycle at 1%, a typical value for
sensor networks [30]. Specifically, the victim node stays
in active state for channel listening for 1 ms in every 0.1
second. If there are packets arriving during the active
period, the node will process the packets and then switch
to sleep if there is still leftover time within the current
0.1-second cycle. If there is no packet received, the node
will directly switch to sleep state upon expiration of the
active period. Such a mechanism would ensure that the
victim device could function properly over one year.
To demonstrate the energy-depletion attack, the ghost
attacker sends crafted messages to this victim node every
0.1 second within its active period.
Fig. 3 reports the average computational energy cost
and time versus the MAC payload size of the bogus
packet for different security suites, where the averages
are taken over 25000 bogus packets sent by the attacker.
Generally, both encryption and decryption energy costs
grow as the payload size increases. Moreover, our sim-
ulation results in Fig. 3(a) and 3(b) demonstrate that the
ascending order of the security suites in terms of the
average per-packet energy cost (for both encryption and
decryption) is as AES-CTR, AES-CBC-MAC, and AES-
CCM. This order is reasonable because more data bytes
are involved in the XORing operations when the protocol
changes from AES-CTR to AES-CCM.
As both the encryption process and the decryption
process pad additional 0’s to the secured payload in
order to partition input data into blocks of 128 bits (16
bytes), the amount of energy expenditure may remain
the same for some payload sizes, which is shown in Fig.
3(b). For instance, with AES-CCM-32, a secured packet
with MAC payload of 20 bytes will be padded by 10
bytes of 0’s so that the resulting string, together with a
2-byte length indicator, has length (in bytes) divisible by
16. However, a MAC payload data of 30 bytes does not
need extra 0’s. As a result, the two secured packets with
different MAC payload sizes consume almost the same
computational energy. It is also interesting to observe
that, for some MAC payload lengths (e.g., 80 bytes in
the figure), the average energy costs for decrypting a
secured packet under the AES-CCM and AES-CBC-MAC
security suites are quite close. In fact, after padding
with necessary 0’s, the total numbers of bytes (including
secured data and authentication fields) that are input to
the XORing operations are very close to each other in
these two security suites.
The processing time by the victim node’s CPU for
decrypting and verifying a secured packet is much
longer than that by its transceiver for receiving it. For
instance, as shown in Fig. 3(c), with AES-CCM-128,
the computation time for decrypting and verifying a
packet with 60-byte payload is about 35 ms, while the
receiving time is only about 3 ms. As shown in Fig.
3(d), over 88% of the victim device’s energy is spent
by its CPU for decrypting crafted packets, which clearly
demonstrates the significance of the ghost attack. We can
also observe that AES-CCM-32 introduces the highest
CPU cost ratio. Note that the computation cost ratios in
all situations slightly decrease when the MAC payload
size increases. The reason is that the payload size does
not significantly impact the computational energy cost,
while it is linearly related to the transceiver’s energy
consumption in receiving.
6.2 Node Lifetime under the Ghost Attack
The ghost attack can significantly drain the energy of
a victim node. For example, we can have a worst-
case estimation according to the configuration given in
Section 6.1. In a network where the active period in
each 0.1-second cycle is around 1 ms, the ghost attacker
sending packet with a payload size of 60 bytes can lead
to a busy period around 35 ms.
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Fig. 4: Amount of time (in days) needed to deplete the
energy, where the attacker sends bogus packets every 0.1
second.
Fig. 4 presents the lifetimes of the victim node in
different scenarios including the case without attack and
the cases with attacks (operated under the 8 security
suites, respectively). The attack is according to the con-
figuration in Section 6.1 with a MAC payload of 60 bytes.
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Fig. 3: Energy and time costs. (a) and (b): average energy consumption for encrypting a packet and decrypting a
secured packet, respectively. (c): average time (ms) for decrypting and verifying a secured packet. (d): percentage
of CPU computational cost in receiving (including decrypting) a secured packet.
The results in Fig. 4 clearly show that the ghost attack
significantly shorten the lifetime from over one year to
days. Specifically, the lifetime reduces to around 10.2%,
6.5% and 6.1% of the baseline value (i.e., without ghost
attack) under AES-CTR, all the AES-CBC-MAC and all
the AES-CCM security suites, respectively. On the other
hand, based on the analysis presented in Section 3.3,
we can easily calculate the lifetime radio L
L0
by using
the computing time shown in Fig. 3(c) and taking into
account the sleep cost. The calculated results are 10.9%,
6.8% and 6.5% for AES-CTR, all the AES-CBC-MAC and
all the AES-CCM security suites, respectively, which well
match the simulation results.
6.3 Denial of Service Attack
The following simulations are conducted on a network
with n = 38 legitimate nodes randomly deployed inside
a 100×100 m2 area, as shown in Fig. 5. The gateway
node is located at the center of this area. All the nodes
(including the attacker node) are assumed to have the
same communication range (30m) and the same interfer-
ence range (40m), respectively. All the legitimate nodes
periodically report data (1 packet/s) to the gateway
through multi-hop routes, where we adopt the shortest
path routing. The attacker node select node 1 as the
victim node and sends bogus packets to it, where the
inter-packet sending intervals obey Poisson distribution
with 20 ms as the mean. Here we interpret the attack
as a DoS attack, according to the discussion in Section
4.1. Simulation results with AES-CTR are reported in the
following.
Fig. 7(b) plots the throughput variation (i.e., the per-
centage of throughput that is increased/decreased due
to the attack) for each node. Note that the red and blue
bards mean positive and negative values, respectively.
Based on this figure, the DoS attack by the ghost attacker
will change the distribution of the network traffics, and
the effects are two-fold. Since the attacker causes node 1
to spend most time on receiving and decrypting crafted
packets, the spare capacity that node 1 can provide to
others for relaying and also transmitting packets of its
own significantly drops. Therefore, nodes, such as node
28, that needs node 1 to relay packets experiences a much
higher packet loss rate in the presence of the attack.
Although other nodes that receive a crafted packet will
directly discard it due to unmatched destination address,
there is still bandwidth and energy waste due to chan-
nel sensing, packet receiving, and collisions due to the
hidden terminal impact [31]. Thus, the throughput of
the attacker’s neighboring nodes (e.g., node 8, 17 and
32) reduces greatly as shown in Fig. 7(b). Therefore,
the attacker can perform denial of service attack at all
its neighboring nodes by just targeting at one of them.
On the other hand, the presence of the attacker may be
beneficial to some other nodes, e.g., node 2, 10, 27, 31 and
37 as shown in Fig. 7(b), which are located far away. For
those nodes, because the traffics of some hidden-terminal
nodes locating within the attacker’s interference range
are partly suppressed by the attacker, their successful
packet deliver ratios increase in turn.
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Fig. 7(a) plots the 3D view of the variation in energy
drain speed. We can see that, under the DoS attack,
the energy drain speed is accelerated for most of the
legitimate nodes. Therefore, the impact of the ghost attack
can be propagated in a multi-hop network such that it
can drain the energy of a larger amount of nodes more
than that of its neighbors.
6.4 Effectiveness of Countermeasures
The performance of the proposed attacker localization
method is demonstrated in Fig. 6 where the attacker
is placed at four different positions. We can see that
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Fig. 7: Impact of DoS attack.
the localization error is around 20m, which is smaller
than the communication range of each legitimate node.
For denser networks, a lower localization error may be
achieved since the positions of more interfered nodes can
be utilized for calculating the attacker’s position.
As shown in Fig. 8(a), the intrusion of the attacker sig-
nificantly reduces the victim node’s traffic, which is then
recovered by blacklisting the attacker so that all future
crafted packets are directly discarded by the victim node
at the MAC layer. In terms of the energy drain speed,
similar trends can be observed in Fig. 8(b). However,
the drain speed cannot be fully recovered because the
victim node’s physical layer energy expenditure for re-
ceiving crafted packets is inevitable. In Section 5, we also
proposed the challenge-response scheme to address both
DoS and replay attacks. The traces of the victim nodes’
traffic and energy drain rates exhibit similar patterns as
shown in Fig. 8(a) and 8(b), and hence are omitted due
to the page limit.
7 EXPERIMENTS
To further validate the effect of ghost, we conduct phys-
ical experiments based on the ZigBee nodes shown in
Fig. 9. Each node has an ATmega128L processor oper-
ating with 8MHz frequency, 128K Bytes In-System pro-
grammable flash, and a CC2420 RF transceiver compliant
with the 2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We develop C
programs to activate the embedded security suites of
IEEE 802.15.4 and control the security level.
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Fig. 9: ZigBee nodes in experiments.
By utilizing an ETCR6000 AC/DC Clamp Leaker with
the sampling rate of 2 times per second, the working
current under different modes of the victim node is
measured and the mean values are shown in Table 2.
In the idle state, i.e., MCU is in idle state and the radio
is turned off, node’s energy is consumed by the basic
node operations including the glowing of LED light.
When we maintain the MCU executing instructions (e.g.,
keeping on adding) incessantly, the energy consumption
is raised by 7mA. Furthermore, when we turn on the
radio, the node’s working current is remarkably raised.
Specifically, if the security suite is implemented into the
procedure of transmission, the current reaches around
40mA; otherwise it reaches around 32mA. The difference
of current between with and without security suite, from
one aspect, demonstrates the effectiveness of security
suite, which happens to be an loophole leveraged by the
adversary.
TABLE 2: Node working current.
Working mode Average current
Idle 11mA
Pure data processing 18mA
Receiving and processing unsecured packets 32mA
Receiving and processing secured packets 40mA
7.1 Single-hop Scenario
A simple single-hop network consisting of an attack
node and a pair of transmitter and receiver/victim nodes
is deployed in the experiments. The transmitter and
victim nodes, separated by a distance of 0.5m, operate
in a low duty-cycling mode. Specifically, they wake up
(by turning on their radios) and stay active for roughly
12
5ms every 50ms. Due to clock drift and the consequent
problem of asynchronous communication rendezvous in
duty-cycling networks, it is possible that the receiver
does not receive anything from the transmitter in one
active period. The ghost attack node is placed close to
both the transmitter and victim nodes. It broadcasts
25 bogus packets per second, where each packet has a
payload size of 60 Bytes.
We measure the lifetime of the victim node which is
powered by a 70-mAh Li-Ion rechargeable battery. We
conduct three groups of independent experiments with
three batteries. In order to have the same initial energy,
the batteries are charged for a same period of time
after they have been completely depleted. We assume
the ghost has unlimited resource; thus, it is powered by
a D.C. stabilized power supply. The transmitter node’s
power supply is a normal AA battery which has much
higher initial energy than that of the victim node.
TABLE 3: Node lifetime in single-hop scenario. Unit is
minute.
Battery Average
#1 #2 #3 Lifetime Percent
E
x
p
er
im
en
ta
l
No attack 86 90 100 92 100%
Under
ghost
attack
011 56 48 65 56 60.9%
100 62 57 71 63 68.5%
111 52 50 60 54 58.7%
M
ap
p
ed
No attack 3858 4285 4458 4200 100%
Under
ghost
attack
011 283 215 329 275 6.6%
100 333 275 379 329 7.8%
111 252 227 291 257 6.1%
The experiment results are shown in Table 3 which
clearly justifies the effectiveness of ghost attack since
the node lifetime is obviously shortened under attack.
Particularly, with the AES-CCM-128 security suite, the
node lifetime is significantly reduced by 39.5%, 44.4%
and 40.0% with respect to the 3 batteries used, respec-
tively. Moreover, the percentages of lifetime reduction
also climbs as the security level increases.
For ease of implementation, the experiments use dif-
ferent settings compared to our simulations in Section
6.2, for which reason the results in Table 3 are different
from those shown in Fig. 4. Beside using different battery
models and different initial battery power, there are three
other major differences between experiments and simu-
lations: 1) A transmitter is introduced to inject packets
to the victim node in the experiments. 2) The duty cycle
of the victim node is 10% in the experiments, larger
than that in the simulations (which is 1%). 3) In our
simulations, once the victim node enters sleep period,
it turns off its radio and switches its CPU to power-save
mode. However, in our experiments, the victim node
only switches off its radio (while keeping its CPU in idle
mode) during its sleep period.
Based on the measured node working current shown
in Table 2, the experiment results in Table 3 are mapped
to those shown in Table 3 by removing the transmitter,
using 1% as the victim node’s duty cycle and switching
its CPU to power-save mode once it begins sleeping.
We can observe that, under the ghost attack, the node
lifetime is remarkably reduced to 6%∼8% of the lifetime
when the attacker is not present. The percentages of
lifetime reduction are very close to those observed in the
simulations shown in Fig. 4. Therefore, our experiments
both confirm the significance of the ghost attack and
validate our methodology of simulations.
7.2 Multi-hop Scenario
We construct a multi-hop network whose topology is the
same as that displayed in Fig. 1. All the legitimate nodes
turn on the radio for 5ms in every 50ms and transmit the
packets to the sink node through the fixed path shown
in the figure. The ghost attack strategy is implemented
in a MicaZ node, which uses the same strategy as in the
above single-node scenario to attack Node 2. Each node
uses the AES-CCM-128 as its security suite. The experi-
ment results of four representative nodes (Node 1, 2, 3
and 5) are shown in Table 4. We can observe that Node
2, the target of the ghost, suffers from the fastest speed
of energy draining. Its lifetime is shortened as much as
31.6%, which basically approaches the performance of
the victim node in our single-hop scenario (as compared
to the experimental results in Table 3). Since Node 1
and 3 also receive the bogus packets, their lifetime is
decreased by 15.8% and 16.2%, respectively. Since the
traffic of Node 1,2 and 3 are suppressed by the ghost,
the throughput of Node 5 increases a little bit, which
causes 9.5% reduction of its lifetime. This trend of Node
5 is also demonstrated in Fig. 2 based on our previous
analytical model.
TABLE 4: Node lifetime in the multi-hop scenario.
Battery Set Average
#1 #2 #3 Lifetime Percent
No at-
tack
N1 85 min 80 min 81 min 82 min 100%
N2 81 min 78 min 79 min 79 min 100%
N3 78 min 71 min 72 min 74 min 100%
N5 88 min 84 min 80 min 84 min 100%
Under
ghost
attack
N1 74 min 64 min 68 min 69 min 84.1%
N2 53 min 52 min 59 min 54 min 68.4%
N3 60 min 62 min 64 min 62 min 83.8%
N5 77 min 73 min 77 min 76 min 90.5%
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel and severe attack
termed as ghost in which the malicious one transmits a
number of bogus messages to lure the receiving victim
device to do the superfluous security-related compu-
tations, leading to battery depletion. Our simulation
results manifest that by launching this attack, an attacker
could easily reduce the lifetime of ZigBee devices from
years to days. We also demonstrate that the ghost at-
tack can further trigger severe DoS and post-depletion
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attacks. We propose several recommendations on how to
withstand the ghost and other related attacks in ZigBee
networks. Extensive simulations are provided to show
the impact of the ghost attack and the performance of
the proposed recommendations. To further validate the
effectiveness of ghost attack, physical experiments were
conducted on ZigBee nodes and interestingly, our results
show that the lifetime of nodes are significantly impacted
with this attack. We believe that the presented work will
aid the researchers to improve the security of ZigBee
networks further.
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